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To sustain expansion of private business investment, Colombia
should consider an investment  tax credit, frequent forecasting of
business variables (to reassure businessmen of the favorable
climate for investment), a shift from historical cost accounting
to replacement cost accounting, and preferential treatment for
small and  medium-size firms in  the allocation of  available
capital.
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Financial  Policy  and Syatl<n
Private business investment has expanded  debt financing should lead to a more balanced
remarkably in Colombia's recent economic  corporate capital structure and possibly a lower
recovery.  Sustained expansion of this invest-  overaU cost of capital.  The elimination of
ment is considered crucial to continued eco-  dividend income taxes as par, of the 1986 tax
nomic growth and increases in production.  reform eliminated double taxation of capital and
thus helped reduce the cost of equity financirg.
Having analyzed demand, the cost of capital,  On the other hand, it prompited  shareholders to
and the availability and allocation of investable  pressure corporate management to distribute
funds, Dailami concludes the following:  more dividends - which limits a corporation's
ability to finance its investments internally.
Motivating firms to expand capacity is a
key requirement for continued expansion.  Many  *  The cost of capital could also be reduced by
firms are already operating at high capacity  shifting the tax treatment of depreciation a  )w-
utilization rates.  An investment tax credit  ances away from listorical cost accounting
designed to lower the effective price of capital  system toward a replacement cost accounting
goods would help to target investment expansion  system.
and hence would be desirable.
* High inflation and low savings rates keep
* Frequent forecasting of such variables as  the prevailing lending rates high in Colombia -
GDP, interest and exchange rates, and credit and  and it is generaUly  easier for larger firms to get
monetary aggregates, would tend to improve the  capital than for small and medium-size firms.
climate for investment by enabling the private  There are at least two reasons why small and
sector to make informed decisions.  medium-size firms should get preferential
treatment in allocation of available capital: (1)
* The real (marginal) cost of capital to the  they tend to be concentrated in relatively more
nonfinancial corporate sector is high in Colom-  labor-intensive activities and sectors, and (2)
bia: currently about 16 percent.  Policy efforts  their existence and survival are necessary to
that induce corporations to substitute equity for  guard against increased industrial monopolies.
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1.  A striking  feature  of the  recent  economic  recovery  in  Colombia  has
been the  remarkable  expansion  of private  investment  outlays. After  having
declined  precipitously  during  the  recession  years  of 1982-1985,  total  private
investment,  adjusted  for  inflation,  increased  at an average  annual  rate  of
14.6  percent  during  1986-1987  period  and  is furthermore  expected  to have
continued  its  expansion  in  1988,  albeit,  at a slower  pace. The  expansion  has
already  broken  past records  in  terms  of durability  and  has led  to
re-establishing  the  dominant  position  of the  private  sector  in the  country's
process  of capital  formation  and  growth  (see  Table  1).  It  has  not  just  been
associated  with certain  cyclical  impulses,  such  as the  upturn  in  business
profitability  in  1986  and  buoyant  economic  growth,  but  also  with favorable
developments  on the  fiscal  side,  which  are  expected  to  have  a more  enduring
impact. There  is,  thus,  the  expectation,  if  not  yet  the  belief,  that  these
developments  may  come  to  mark  an important  turning  point  in the  course  of
Colombian  macro-economic  policy  and  performance  and  set  the  agenda  for  the
medium-term  economic  strategy  and  policy.
2.  The  broad  objective  of sucb  a strategy  is to  launch  the  economy  on a
path  of sustained  long-term  growth  in  accordance  with the  developmental  needs
of the  1990s  and  in cognizance  of the  expected  shrinkage  of foreign  capital
inflows. The  main impetus  of economic  growth  is  to come  from  the  expansion
of private  investment  with  public  investment  resources  gradually  gearedTABLE  1,  COLOMBIA  :  TOTAL  DOMESTIC  AND
PRIVATE  INVESTMENT,  1970-1987
. ..  ......  ,,.......  . . . . . . . .,.  . . . . . . . . ..  . . _  . . . . ..  . . . . . . . .
1970-79  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987
GROWTH  RATE :  PERCENT  PER  ANNUM
Gross
Dom.
Inv.  7.41  10.88  13.23  5.33  -2.15  -5.89  -9.64  5.14  5.5
Total
Pvt.
Inv.  6.62  -2.07  10.11  -2.26  0.27  -10.97  -14.95  13.92  15.31
PERCENTAGE  OF  GROSS  DOMESTIC  PRODUCT
Gross
Dom.
Inv.  18.72  19.07  20.62  20.49  19.89  18.96  19.04  17.95  19.00
Total
Pvt.





inv  (%)  66.61  59.99  58.34  54.12  55.46  52.48  49.42  53.54  58.42
. ....  .....  ................................................................  . . ..  ..  .
Source:  Banco  de la  Republica;  National  Department  of  Statistics  (DANE),
and  National  Department  of  Planning  (DNP).-3.
towards  social  areas. The  underlying  logic  is  straight  forward  and  is
predicated  on the  notion  that  an increase  in  allocation  of national  resources
towards  private  business  investment  should  boost  aggregate  demand  through  the
multiplier  process,  dampen  inflation  through  its  positive  influence  on
aggregate  output  and  productive  capacity,  and  lead  to enhance  the  overall
gain  in  productivity  and  efficiency  of resource  use. These  are  highly
desirable  outcomes,  considering  inflation  has reached  its  recent-time  peak,
industrial  productive  capacity  is at its  limitation,  and  productivity  is
lagging.
3.  But  desirability  is  hardly  a guarantee  for  success. What is  required
is  a consistent  framework  of policy  initiative  and  measures  designed  to
strengthen  the  underlying  demand  for  expansion  in  capacity,  to facilitate
resource  transfer  to the  private  sector  in  order  to  meet that  sector's
growing  financing  requirements,  and  to influence  favorably  the  relationship
between  the  return  on investment  and  the  cost  of capital. These  measures
relate  at the  macro  level  to three  areas  of economic  policy;  i.e.  demand,
financial  and taxation.  Their  strength  in influencing  private  investment  in
Colombia  derives  basically  from  the  following  observations:
a) aggregate  private  investment  in  Colombia  has in  the  past  been  highly
sensitive  to  aggregate  demand,  particularly  internal  demand  conditions;
b) the  corporate  sector  is  highly  leveraged  and  has traditionally  relied
on debt  to finance  its  investment  and  growth;
c) the  interaction  between  taxation  and  inflation  has  been crucial  in
lowering  the  real  cost  of capital  to  match  profitability  and  return  on
investment;  and-4-
social  areas. The  underlying  logic  is strAght forward  and is  predicated  on
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private  business  investment  should  boost  agqregate  demand  through  the
multiplier  process,  dampen  inflation  through  its  positive  influence  on
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desirable  outcomes,  considering  inflation  has reached  its  recent-time  peak,
industrial  productive  capacity  is  at its  limitation,  and  productivity  is
lagging.
3.  But  desirability  is  hardly  a guarantee  for  success. What is  required
is a consistent  framework  of  policy  initiative  and  measures  designed  to
strengthen  the  underlying  demand  for  expansion  in  capacity,  to facilitate
resource  transfer  to the  private  sector  in  order  to  meet  that  sector's
growing  financing  requirements,  and  to influence  favorably  the  relationship
between  the  return  on investment  and  the  cost  of  capital. These  measures
relate  at the  macro  level  to  three  areas  of economic  policy;  i.e.  demand,
financial  and taxation.  Their  strength  in influencing  private  investment  in
Colombia  derives  basically  from  the  following  observations:
a) aggregate  private  investment  in  Colombia  has in the  past  been  highly
sensitive  to  aggregate  demand,  particularly  internal  demand  conditions;
b) the  corporate  sector  is  highly  leveraged  and  has traditionally  relied
on debt  to finance  its  investment  and  growth;
c) the  interaction  between  taxation  and inflation  has  been  crucial  in
lowering  the  real  cost  of capital  to  match  profitability  and  return  on
investment;  and- 5 -
d) the  degree  of  government  intervention  in the  financial  markets  in
terms  of directed  credit  programs  has  been important  in influencing  the
evolution  ana  structure  of financial  markets  and  the  allocatton  of credit  to
firms  and  households.
4.  These  considerations  set  the  stage  for  the  analysis  and  policy
discussion  that  follow. The  analysis  in  divided  into  three  parts:  (i)  the
relationship  between  aggregate  demand  and  investment;  (ii)  the  influence  of
financial  policy  on investment;  and  (iii)  taxation  and  the  cost  of capital.
In  addition,  a concluding  section  contains  the  main  result  and  policy
suggestions,  and  an annex  presents  the  technical  and  theoretical  discussion
for  determinants  of marginal  cost  of  capital  under  Colombia  tax  code.
II.  Ag_g_TatT  Demand  and  Invastment
1.  . trical  Let1aAtf
5.  The  basis  for  consideration  of  potential  demand  policy  influences  on
private  investment  behavior  in  Colombia  is  the  historical  relationship
between  aggregate  private  investment  and  demand. This relationship  has  been
very strong  and  robust  as illustrated  by estimation  results  of equations  (1)
through  (7)  contained  in  Table  2.  The  equations  are  based  o&I  an accelerator
model  of private  investment  behavior,  whereby  investment  responds  to changes
in  aggregate  demand  via changes  in  the  desired  level  of capital  stock. To
capture  the  influence  of supply  of credit,  total  outstanding  loan  from
financial  institutions  is  also  included,  and  several  lag  specifications  were
considered  to  highlight  the  underlying  dynamics  between  aggregate  investment
and  demand. Finally,  aggregate  demand  was  decomposed  into  domestic  and
external  components. Estimating  the  model  over 1971-1987  period,  several
important  conclusions  emerge:- 6 -
6.  First,  that  aggregate  private  investment  in  Colombia  iBas been  highly
sensltive  to domestic  demand  conditions.  Thus,  changes  in  domestic  demand
have  been  consistently  significant  and  important  explanation  of investment
variability  in  Colombia. For  instance,  one  percentage  point  increase  in the
rate  of growth  of aggregate  domestic  demand  leads  to  an increase  of 2.8
percent  increase  in the  level  of rsal.  private  investment  in the  short  run,
and  5.6  percent  in the  long  run. 1 These  results  remain  rather  robust  for
various  specification  of the  model.
7.  Second,  in  contrast  to  domestic  demand,  external  demand  has  not  been
an important  stimulus  to  private  investment.  Statistically,  aggregate  real
external  demand  does  not  contribute  to the  explanation  of past  behavior  of
private  investment. 2 This,  however,  is  not surprising  given  the  weight  of
housing  investment  in  aggregate  private  investment  data 3 and  the  well-known
characteristic  of the  business  sector  in  Colombia  which  tends  to  be highly
oriented  towards  internal  rather  than  external  conditions.
8.  Third,  considering  the  estimated  multiple  correlation  coefficients  of
the  set  of equations  reported  in  Table  2, it is  evident  that  the  model
explains  roughly  one-half  of variability  of past  behavior  of  private
1  This is  based  on equation  (4)  in the  Table,  which  is  statistically
considered  as the  most  appropriate  equatinn.
2  The  partial  correlation  coefficient  between  changes  in  aggregate  private
investment  and  foreign  demand  is  estimated  over  the  period  1967-1987  to  be
-0.14,  but is  not statistically  significant.  It is to  be noted,  however,
that  such  correlation,  or the  econometric  findings  presented  above,  provides
only  a partial  analysis  of the  relationship  between  domestic  investment  and
external  demand. A more  detailed  analysis  should  also  incorporate  the
balance  of  payments  effect  of the  relationship  between  domestic  investment
and  external  demand. In that  case,  changes  in  external  demand  would
influence  domestic  investment  through  availability  and  cost  of import.ed
capital  goods.
3 Total  household  investment  in  residential  and  durable  goods  accounted
during  the  period  1970-1985  for  about  one-third  of total  private  investment
outlays,  or about  4.2  percent  of  GDP._ 7
investment  in Colombia. In other  words,  roughly  one-half  of investment
fluctuations  remain  unexplained,  which  are  attributable  to other  factors  and
presumably  to the  state  of  business  confidence  or "animal  spirit". This  th^n
suggests  for  certain  degree  of caution  in  relying  on a private  investment-led
growth  strategy. The  point  is that  such  a  strategy  involves  certain  measures
of risk  relating  principally  to the  unpredictability  and  volatility  of
private  investment  behavior,  which,  in  Colombia,  has in the  past  been
particularly  pronounced.
2.  Po118!  Implications
9.  The  above  empirical  investigation  of the  aggregate  relationship
between  private  investment  and  demand  provides  a strong  case for  the  proper
management  of aggregate  demand. It is  evident  that  a  balanced  expansion  of
aggregate  demand,  particularly  domestic,  is critical  to the  success  of a
private  investment-led  growth  strategy. Without  that,  firms  have  no reasons
or motives  to  expand  capacity  and  hence  tc  order  new  machinery  and  equipment.
To stimulate  demand,  policies  need  to  be frsmed  within  the  broader  macro
economic  context,  within  which  the  inflationary  consequence  of such  policies
are  given  due  attention. The  detailed  formulation  and  design  of  such
policies  and  their  instrumentalities  and  mixes  are  beyond  the  scope  of this
paper,  but, given  the  past  trend  of inflation  in  Colombia,  which  has shown  a
high degree  of sensitivity  to  aggregate  demand  conditions,  there  is little
doubt -hat  expansionary  policies  need to  be targeted  to encourage  investment
demand,  rather  than  consumption.  In this  respect an investment  tax  credit
scheme  for  new  investment  represents  a  desirable  option. This  scheme  is
desirable  because  it  helps  to  offset,  to  some  degree,  the  adverse  impact  of
the  1986  tax  reform  on the  cost  of  capital.
10.  As will  be detailed  below,  the  provision  regarding  the  gradual
elimination  of  deductibility  of inflationary  component  of  business  interest
payments  will tend  to increase  the  cost  of funds  to  corporate  borrowers;  the- 8 -
Tablo  2
Estimation  R.sults  for  Relationship  between
Aggregate  Privato  Investment  and  Demand  Components
1/  1/  1/  1/
Eq.  Constant  4cn  Yt  Alnyt-i  &lnzt  lnzt-.  In  It  ln  L  R 2 DW
(1)  2.25  2.35  1.22  -0.17  0.31  0.36  0.40  0.63  2.20
(0.65)  (1.35)  (0.87)  (-0.40)  (0.76)  (0.90)  (1.99)
(2)  2.29  2.61  - -G.14  0.19  0.48  0.29  0.60  2.18
(0.68)  (1.55)  (-0.32)  (0.50)  (1.28)  (1.88)
(3)  2.61  2.57  - -0.14  - 0.43  0.30  0.59  2.17
(0.81)  (1.58)  (-0.35)  (1.24)  (2.05)
(4)  2.09  2.84  - - - 0.49  0.29  0.59  2.21
(0.76)  (2.05)  (1.61)  (2.11)
(5)  1.06  2.75  - -0.03  0.30  0.89  - 0.46  2,37
(0.29)  (1.47)  (-0.07)  (0.72)  (2.69)
(6)  1.50  2.69  - -0.03  - 0.85  - 0.44  2.34
(0.42)  (1.47)  (-0.08)  (2.66)
(7)  1.38  2.76  - - - 0.86  - 0.44  2.35
(0.45)  (1.77)  (3.14)
Note:  The  variables  are  defined  as:  I  - real  aggregate  private  investment
outlays,  y  - real  aggregate  domestic  demand,  z  - real  aggregate  foreign
demand,  and  Lt  - total  outstanding  loans  from  financial  institutions.
All  variables  are  in 1975  constant  prices  (millions  of Col.$).
t-statistics  are  in  parentheses  and  the  data  is  annual  from  1971  to  1986.
1/ a  is the  difference  operator;  i.e.,  & ln  Yt  - ln  Yt  - ln  Yt-i.- 9  -
impact  of such increase  Li the  cost  of funds  on the  overall  cost  of
investment  can  be alleviated  through  the  proposed  investment  tax  credit
scheme  which  works  to reduce  the  price  of  new  capital  goods.
11.  The  potential  for  encouraging  private  business  investment  through
efforts  to stimulate  external  demand  needs  also  to  be explored. The
observation  that  such  a channel  has  not  been statistically  important  in  the
pas; should  not  be used  as evidence  against  consideration  of its  future
potential. Moreover,  such  strategy  needs  tc  be viewed  in light  of its
favorable  balance  of  payment  implications  and  greater  availability  of foreign
exchange  and  hence  supply  of imported  capital  goods.
12.  Finally,  in  considering  the  potential  influence  of domestic  demand
expansion  on the  evolution  of private  investment  in the  future,  it is
important  to take  account  of the  favorable  trend  in  productivity  gain  that
will  be associated  with an increased  share  of private  investment  in the
country's  total  capital  formation. To the  extent  that  the  lagging  behavior
of  productivity  growth  in  the  past  had  been associated  with increase  in the
share  of public  investment, 4 the  substitution  of  private  for  public  investment
in the  future  will lead  to  reduce  inflationary  tendencies  and  hence  widen  the
scope  for  expansionary  demad policies. More  expansionary  domestic  demand
policies  will feed  into  higher  investment,  and  thereby  increased  supply
potential  and  faster  growth.
4 In fact,  the  pattern  of aggregate  private  investment  in  Colombia  has, over
the  past  two  decades,  mirrored  that  of  public  investment.  In  other  words,
changes  f.n  aggregate  public  and  private  investments  have tended  to  offset
each  other  with the  consequence  that  total  domestic  investment  expenditures
has,  in relation  to  GDP,  remained  relatively  constant. Despite  substantial
variation  in its  components,  total  domestic  investment  has shown  since  the
mid 1960s  no time  trend;  it  has  hovered  near 19  percent  rf GDP  throughout
this  period. (The  mean  has  been  18.9  percent,  with a standard  deviation
around  the  mean of only  1.13  percent.)- 10  _
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1.  Poliey Pramework
13.  Against  this  background  of  aggregate  demand expansion,  the  relevant
financial  policy  requlrements  for  a  medium-ters  investment  strategy  relate
basically  to  two  issues:  (i)  the  availabillty  of  funds  to  pay  for  investment
and  (ii)  the  cost  of  capital  relative  to  return  on  investment.  Seen  in  a
macro-economic  perspectlve,  these  aspects  of  fLiance  depend  on  the  capacity
and  structure  of  financial  markets  to  allocate  funds  to  the  business  sector,
on  the  extent  and  nature  of  government  intervention,  and  on  the  determinants
of  profitability  such  as  real  wages  and  efficiency  of  capital  use.  But  such
a  macro  perspective  needs  also  to  be  supplemented  by  a  disaggregated  view  of
company  finance  to  take  account  of  companies'  specifLc  characteristics  which
give  rise  to  credit  rationing  and  quantitative  constraints.  It  is  known,  for
instance,  that  small  and  medium-size  firms  in  Colombia  operete  under  much
tighter  restrictive  financial  environments  thmn do  large  and  reputable  ones.
For  the  former  class  of  firms,  it  is  not  so  much the  cost  of  capital  as  it  is
the  sheer  availability  of  capital  which  is  often  the  operating  constraint  on
their  investment  behavior.  These  firms,  in  contrast  to  large  ones,  do  not
have  realistically  the  option  of  raising  fresh  capital  through  capital
markets.  They are  also  excluded  from  the  inter-firm  market  which  caters
exclusively  to  the  needs  of  large  and  reputable  companies.  The main  sources
of  funds,  beside  their  own internal  sources,  are  loans  from  financial- 11  -
institutions  and  curb  markets. 5 Hence,  they  are  highly  vulnerable  to the
impact  of monetary  and  credit  squeezes.
14.  Such  characteristics  of company  finance,  coupled  with consideration
of several  structural  features  of  Colombia's  financial  markets  such  as
segmentation,  and a  high  degree  of  bias towards  short-term  end  of maturity
spectrum,  provide  the  main  rationale  for  the  role  of financial  policy
affecting  the  availability  and  cost  of capital  to influence  business
investment  behavior. Such  a role  of financial  policy  is further  reinforced
once  it is  viewed  against  the  understanding  tlat  the  scope  for  policy
influence  on the  profitability  side  seems  rather  limited. There  is a strong
cyclical  component  in  pattern  of profitability  in  Colombia,  which  stems  from
the  cyclical  behaviLr  of real  wages  and  rate  of  capacity  utilization. Both
of these  factors  are strongly  influenced  by business  cycle  conditions.
Nominal  wages  in Colombia  increase  normally  with  the  rate  of inflation,  but
5  Interestingly,  by classifying  firms  by asset  size,  it  becomes  evident  that
the  very  small  and  the  very large  firms  are  relatively  less  leveraged  than
medium-size  firms  (see  Figure  below). The  very  small  firms  (with  assets  less
than  Col.$200  million)  have less  debt  mainly  because  they  tend  to  be crowded
out  in  the  credit  market,  and  the  very large  firms  (with  assets  exceeding
Col.$5000  million)  resort  to  equity  markets  and  have the  opportunity  of  Sigh
internal  cash  generation  due to their  higher  profitability  performances.
:11tSIM94  t  f  2es<4110:7  M.1.0 14;::J  wt.-S
.3
0  - M  I~~*1
1,.MO
as*wa  or"  oe  d.ue  m- lc  -
the  adjustment  involves  a one-year  lag.6  An a  consequence,  profits  tend  to
increase  during  periods  of  high  inflation.  Also,  to  the  extent  that
inflation  moves  pro-cyclically,  profits  move  similarly.  This  means  that
profits  are  high  during  the  upward  phase  of  the  cycle,  as  evident  by  the
experience  of  the  1986  - 1987  period,  and  low  during  the  downturn.  In  this
sense,  the  extent  to  which  policy  can  influence  profitability  depends  on  its
success  in  influencing  the  business  cycle.
15.  Thus,  the  key  to  the  question  of  how  financial  policy  affecting  the
cost  and  availability  of  funds  may  influence  business  investment  decisions
and  performances  is  the  understanding  of  firms'  capital  structure;  i.e.,  the
ways  and  means  by  which  companies  finance  their  investment  and  growth.
2.  Struecture  of  Cornorate  Finance
a) Needs  for  Fund-.
16.  But,  while  concern  in  this  respect  relates  to  the  financing  of  fixed
investment,  it  is important  to  note  that  fixed  investment  outlays  constitute
only  one  element  of  the  broader  corporate  uses  of  funds.  In  addition  to
using  funds  for  purposes  of  fixed  investment,  i.e.,  plant,  equipment,  and
real  estate  corporations  need  funds  for  holding  inventories,  for  financing
trade  debtors,  and  for  holding  cash  and  other  liquid  assets,  as  well  as  for
purposes  of  acquiring  financial  assets..  These  additional  uses  of  funds  which
arise  from  corporations'  normal  operating  requirements,  as  well  as  from  their
role  as  financial  intermediaries,  have  been,  indeed,  quite  important  in  the
context  of  Colombian  non-financial  corporate  sector.  Table  3  confirms  this
assertion.
6  As  implied  from  the  Modigliani-Miller  Theorem  (1958),  under  perfect  capital
market  conditions  and  no  taxes,  firms'  real  investment  decisions  are
independent  of  their  financial  structure.  Under  these  conditions,  there  is
no  role  for  financial  policy  to  influence  real  investment  decisions.  For  a
criticism  of  the  Modigliani-Miller  Theorem,  in  the  context  of  developing
countries,  see  Dailami  (1988)._ 13 -
Table  3 , Colombia  :  Composition  of  Corporate  Assets:  Non-ftnancial,
Corporate  Sector.  1980-1985
(Percentage  of total  Assets)
--............  .............................  .....  ...........  ............  ................................  ..........  .........  ......  ................
Average
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1980-1985
ASSETS
Fixed  assets  27.18  30.38  32.13  31.43  31.73  33.74  31.10
Inventories  20.73  19.25  17.90  15.45  15.28  14.45  17.18
Accts  receivable  31.68  29.93  27.14  28.61  27.58  24.55  28.25
Liquid  assets  6.72  7.10  6.81  6.53  7.10  5.66  6.65
Subtotal  86.31  86.66  83.99  82.02  81.69  78.40  83.18
Financial  assets  13.69  13.34  16.01  17.98  18.31  21.60  16.82
Total  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00
~~. . ...........  ...  ..  .....  ....  ......  ..  ........  ...  .................  ....  ..  .......  ...........
Source:  Staff  estimates  based  on  SuperLntendencia  de  Sociedades,  Boletin
Estadistico,  various  issues.- 14  -
The  Table  uses  consolidated  balance  sheet  data,  as reported  by the
Superintendencia  de Sociedades,  to  provide  a detailed  breakdown  of total
corporate  assets  into  five  categories,  namely,  fixed  assets;  inventories;
accounts  receivable;  liquid  assets;  and financial  assets. Fixed  assets  have,
on average,  accounted,  over  the  period  1980-1985,  for  about  33  percent  of
corporate  total  assets,  compared  with a ratio  of 14 percent  for  inventories,
24.5  percent  for  accounts  receivable,  5  percent  for  liquid  assets,  and,
finally,  21.6  percent  for  financial  assets.
17.  In  comparison  with  other  countries,  the  share  of fixed  assets  in
total  corporate  assets  in Colombia  is  not  unusually  low.  It is,  indeed,
closely  comparable  to  the  situation  in  other  developing  countries,  such  as
Korea,  India,  and  Turkey,  but  not to the  U.S.  and  the  U.K.,  where  the  figure
is  significantly  higher  (See  Table  4).  In the  latter  two  countries  fixed
assets  seem  to  have  accounted  in  recent  years  for  over  50  percent  of total
corporate  business  assets,  as compared  to  a ratio  of  between  30-40  percent  in
the  developing  countries,  including  Colombia. But,  perhaps,  more striking,
in the  case  of Colombia,  is the  relatively  high share  of financial  assets  in
corporate  balance  sheet. In  1983,  for  instance,  financial  assets  accounted
in  aggregate  for  about  20  percent  of total  assets  in the  non-financial
corporate  in  Colombia. This is  about  twice  as high  as the  corresponding
ratio  observed  in  developed  countries,  such  as the  U.S.A.,  Japan,  and the
U.K.  It is  also  higher  than  the  corresponding  figure  in  Korea,  where  the
non-financial  sector  is  known  to engage  in  a high  degree  of financial
intermediation.
18.  Several  factors  account  for  the  relatively  high  share  of financial
assets  in  Colombian  corporate  sector. First,  access  to subsidized  credit
through  development  funds  has  been  an important  encouragement  for  firms  to
hold financial  assets  and  to  perform  financial  intermediation.  This reflectsTable  4:  Composition  of  CorDorate-Business-Assets  n  Selected_Countries.  1983
(percentage  of total  assets)
Columbia  1/  Germany  21  India  31  Japan  21  Korea  41  Turkey  51  U.K.  21 USA  2/  Zimbabwe  61
1. Fixed  Assets  al  32.24  32.38  41.75  27.19  39.62  34.90  41.76  61.00  55.85
2. Inventories  bi  15.38  21.18  29.97  14.01  17.72  19.80  20.39  14.62  23.15
3.  Accounts
Receivable  cl  26.02  29.99  f/  20.46  36.81  16.57  24.16  23.37  13.58  14.28
4. Liquid  Assets  dl  6.48  4.01  6.31  13.32  10.93  5.72  7.13  5.59  2.49
5.  Other  Assets  el  19,88  12.44  1.51  8.67  15.16  15.42  7.35  5.21  4.61
6. Total  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00 100.00 100.00  100.00
a/  Net  of accumulated  depreciation.
bl  Work in  progress  and  raw  materials.
cl  Trade  and  other  account  receivable.
dl  Cash,  bank  deposits  and  marketable  securities.
e/  Includes  investments  and  other  deposits.
fl  Includes  short  term  bills  and  bonds.
Source:  1/  Superintendencia  de Sociedades.  Boletin  Estadistico  No.  6, 1983.
2/  OECD  Financial  Statistics  Part  3, 1986.
Non  Financial  Corporations  in  Germany,  Japan  (total  sample),  U.K. (large  companies  in  all
industries)  and  U.S.A.
3/  Reserve  Bank  of India  Bulletin,  1986.
4/  Bank  of Norea,  Financial  Statement  Analysis,  1983.
51  Industrial  Development  Bank,  1987. Consolidated  balance  sheets  of 185  companies.
6/  Based  on the  48  listed  Companies  in the  Zimbabwe  Stock  Exchange,  1988.16 -
the  fact  that  firms  engage  in financial  intermediation  in  addition  to their
traditional  role  of producing  goods  and  services. The  exact  extent  and
causes  of such  financial  intermediation  are  difficult  to establish,  given  the
subsidiary  grouping  character  of corporations  in  Colombia  and  a large  amount
of gross  equity  holdings. Nevertheless,  one  important  implication  is  clear;
financial  revenues  are important  components  of  business  operating  income.
Over  the  1983-1986  period,  interest  incomes  averaged  150  billion  pesos
compared  to total  operating  income  of Col$321  billion,  or about  47 percent
(See  Table  5).  This reduces  sensitivity  of firms'  fixed  investment  demand
towards  interest  rate  changes.
b)  ources of Ftnds.
19.  The  corporate  sector  in  Colombia  has  traditionally,  at least  over  the
past  two  decades,  relied  on debt  financing,  including  foreign  debt,  to a
considerable  degree. Debt  has increasingly  become  the  predominant  means  of
company  finance.  Total  liabilities,  including  borrowing  and trade  payables,
accounted  in 1985,  for  instance,  for  about  80  percent  of  aggregate
non-financial  sector  total  liabilities,  or four  times  as  much  as the  total
amount  of shareholders'  equity  (see  Table  6).  This  confirms  the  generally
held  view that  the  corporate  sector  in Colombia  is  highly  leveraged.  More
alarmingly,  a  closer  look  reveals  that  much  of corporate  debt  is concentrated
at the  short-end  of the  maturity  spectrum;  short-term  liabilities  accounted
in 1985  for  more than  one-half  of total  liabilities,  or nearly  40 percent  of
total  assets. Of these,  roughly  one-third  is  accounted  by trade  payables,
and  the  rest  by short-term  borrowing  from  financial  institutions.  Given  the
paucity  of direct  borrowing  through  bond issues,  almost  all  of long-term
liabilities  are  in the  form  of  borrowing,  mostly  from  domestic  financial
institutions.  Total  loans  from  domestic  financial  institutions  to  corporateTfaie5:  Soures  of kssinvis  It  Olpeailng  ltw  Bllilons  of  Pe  se and
Petrrnta"w  of  Total.  I t11  le6.
year  aperatIng  Profit  Interest  Inee_  Operating  Incee
...-  --  --------------------------  -------------------------  - -- _-_-_-_-_-.-_-_-_---..-----
Statio  Peso  Poreeot  Sllon  Poe.  Percent  Pillion  Feso  Pereent
1963  96)  i  it  16  3 2. 51  201.19  100.00
1966  196.83  53.0  129.15  6. e3  2S1.U8  j0o0.0
191s  1to.16  so.e06  a.Is  69.99  360  0  i00o.0o
1466  261.29  18.33  169.&9  *1.6?  619.12  100.00
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Table  6:  Composition  of  Llabillty  Slde  of  Islance  Sheet
for  Colombian  Non-Financial  Corporate  Sector
Year  End  1983,  Percentage  of Total  Assets
1.  Short  Term  Liabilities  37.65
a. Trade  Payables  12.18
b. Short  term  borroving  23.03
c. Other  liabilities  2.43
2.  Long  Term  Liabilities  34.73
a.  Bonds  0.15
b. Long  term  borrowing  34.58
3.  Other  Liabilities  7.91
4.  Total  Liabilities  80.29
5.  Shareholders  Equity  19.71
6.  Total  Liabilities  and
Shareholders  Equity  100.00
Source: Staff  estimate  based  on  data  from  Superintendencia  de Sociedades- 19  -
sector  have accounted  for  about  40  percent of total  corporate  liabilities.
The  high degree  of corporate  indebtedness  in  Colombia  is  noteworthy. It is
also  of recent  origin. Indeed,  even  in the  early  1970s,  the  ratios  of debt
to assets  were  much lower,  averaging  40 percent  for  the  non-financial
corporate  sector.
3.  Ialning  a  Pattern  of Corporate  liane
20.  What  has  caused  corporations  in  Colombia  to increase  their
indebtedness  over  the  past two  decades? In  addressing  this  question,  two
factors  are  considered:  (i)  that  the  growth  of corporate  sector  has  generated
needs  for  funds  much in  excess  of its  own  capacity  to supply  internally  and
(ii)  that  government  policy  with  regard  to int3  rest  rate  subsidy  associated
with development  credit  lines  (fondos  financimros)  and  taxation  have
considerably  lowered  the  real  effective  cost  of debt  to corporate  borrowers.
21.  With regard  to the  first  factor,  the  underlying  premise  is  the  basic
fact  that  the  supply  of internally  generated  funds  - retained  earnings  and
capital  consumption  allowances  - imposes,  inevitably,  a  ceiling  on the  growth
of corporate  investment  and  assets. To see  the  logic  of this  argument,  it is
only  necessary  to  understand  the  dynamics  of asset  accumulation  of a purely
self-financing  firm,  which  under  the  Colombian  tax  regime  is  determined  by
two  basic  parameters:  the  rate  of the  firm's  operating  profits  and its  income
tax  rate.  Accordingly,  based  on the  assumption  of a  corporate  profit  rate  of
40 percent  and  statutory  corporate  tax  rate  of 39  percent,  which  corresponds
to the  average  of 1976-1985  period,  it follows  directly  that  the  highest  rate
of growth  in  total  assets  that  could  have  been  achieved  under  a
self-financing  strategy  (i.e.  if  firms  paid  no dividends  or interest)  would
have  been  about  24.4  percent  per  year.  In  redlity  corporations  in  Colombia
were paying  substantial  dividends  and  were  highly  leveraged  and,- 20 -
interestingly,  grew  at  an average  annual  rate  of 42  percent  during  that  time
period. In other  words,  if  the  firms  had  been  only  financed  through  earning
retentions,  they  would  have grown  at roughly  one-half  of the  ra.e  that  they
actually  did.
22.  Regarding  the  impact  of the  government  policy  on the  real  effective
cost  of debt to  corporate  borrowers  two  observations  are  relevant:
23.  First,  loans  advanced  to  priority  sectors  such  as exports,
agriculture,  and  industry  are  partly  subsidized  through  rediscount  facilities
at the  central  bank.  These  loans  which  are  administered  by comercial and
development  batks  are  formally  regulated  through  the  operation  of several
development  funds  (Fondos  Financieros).  The  degree  of subsidization  varies
from  fund  to fund  and  from  year  to  year.  In 1987,  for  example,  the  combined
credit  extended  to the  business  sector  through  these  funds  accounted  for  19
percent  of total  outstanding  loans  of formal  credit  market  to the  business
sector. The average  lending  rate  on these  loans  were 31.4  percent,  as
compared  to an average  market  lending  rate  of 41 percent.
24.  Second,  in  addition  to this  particular  feature  oa  credit  allocation
in Colombia,  there  are  other  institutional,  structural  anI  policy  factors
which  have  worked  to  make  debt  financing  cheaper  than  equity  financing.  One
important  factor,  in this  context,  has  been  the  taxation  of corporate  capital
income  in the  Colombian  environment  of high inflation.  Until  the  tax  reform
of 1986,  corporations  were  allowed  to fully  deduct  interest  payments  against
their  income  taxes. But  presumably,  part  of such  interest  payments  were
attributable  to the  inflationary  component  of interest  rates,  and in  that
case  were, in  essence,  payments  of the  principal  rather  than  payments  for  the
use  of debt.  In this  sense,  the  higher  the  rate  of inflation,  the  hiigher  the- 21  _
servicing  of principal  which  benefited  from  tax  deductibility  of interest
expenses. Given  the  relatively  high  rate  of inflation  in  Colombia,  the
magnitude  of such  tax-cum-inflation  related  reduction  in the  cost  of
borrowing  has  been sizeable,  as  will  be elaborated  below.
4.  Directed  Credit  and  Business  Investment
a)  main Policy  Issues.
25.  Against  this  background  of corporate  pattern  of finance  and  real
investment  in  Colombia,  the  question  of  how  government-directed  intervention
in  credit  allocation  process  may  affect  private  business  investment  behavior
revolves  around  two  issues: First,  how important  are  government  credit
programs  in  relation  to the  total  availability  of loanable  funds  to  corporate
borrowers. And  second,  how significant  are  interest  rate  subsidies
associated  with  government  directed  credit  programs  in the  overall  cost  of
debt  and  capital  to  corporate  borrowers. These  questions  need to  be
approached  bearing  in  mind  the  various  needs  and  policy  objectives  which  have
historically  motivated  the  government  to take  an active  role  in the  credit
market. Three  sets  of such  needs  have  been instrumental  in  Colombia:  (i)  to
supplement  the  capacity  of financial  institutions  to  supply  medium-  and
long-term  capital  to the  industrial  and  agricultural  sectors; (ii)  to
reallocate  resources  towards  priority  sectors  and  activities,  snd (iii)  to
deploy  finance  as a tool  of advancing  certain  social/regional  and  political
objectives. Some  aspects  of these  needs  have,  of course,  changed  through
time  and the  links  between  the  original  policy  objectives  and  the  specific
form  of credit  programs  have  become  increasingly  questionable.  There  is,  in
particular,  a growing  concern  whether  the  programs  themselves  have  not  been
important  causes  of Colombia's  financial  market  imperfection  and  structural
imbalances.- 22 -
26.  There  is  no argument  that  financial  intermediaries  in Colombia  are
relatively  biased  towards  the  short-end  of  maturity  spectrum. Signs  of this
"short-termism"  are  readily  visible  in  many  aspects  of financial  system,
including  the  low  maturity  of  banking  system  loan  portfolio,  the  virtual
absence  of long-term  debt instruments,  the  small  size  of the  equity  market,
and  the  dominant  share  of short-term  debt  in  corporate  capital  structure.
The  average  maturity  of  banking  system's  loan  portfolio  is  estimated  for  the
period  of 1970 - 1986  to  be about  4.2  years  when  housing  sector  loans  are
included  and  to  be the  2.1  when these  loans  are  excluded. 7 In the  same  vein,
the  market  capitalization  of  corporate  equity  in  relation  to  GDP  averaged  in
Colombia  over  the  period  of 1980  - 1986  to 3.96  percent  as compared  to  values
of 24.13  percent  in  Chile,  13.7  percent  in  Brazil,  48.6  percent  in  Malaysia,
or an average  of 31.2  percent  in  developed  countries.
27.  These  are  clear  expressions  of the  degree  of short-term  bias in
financial  intermediaries.  The causes  of this  phenomenon  are  several,  as  will
be demonstrated  below. But  before  engaging  in  this  investigation,  it is
important  to  note that  "short  termism"  entails  real  economic  costs,  both in
terms  of higher  cost  of intermediation  brought  about  as a consequence  of
higher  administrative  and  operational  cost  of financial  intermediations,  and
in terms  of failing  to diversify  risk.  From  the  latter  perspective,  a
two-year  loan  contract  on a  project  with  gestation  period  of two  years,  for
instance,  is  not  equivalent  to a  one-year  loan  contract  which,  in  principle,
can  be rolled  over. Under  the  second  arrangement,  the  issuing  bank  has the
option  of rolling  or not  rolling  at the  end  of the  first  year,  and  hence
concentrating  the  risk  of investment  with the  borrower.
7 Based  on  a classification  of loan  portfolio  of  bankings  systems  into  short,
medium,  and  long-term,  and  assigning  one  year for  short-term,  three  years  for
medium,  and  five  years  for  long-term  values. For  the  loans  to the  housing
sector,  long-term  loans  were  assumed  to  have  an average  maximum  of 12  years.- 23 -
28.  With  regard  to the  causes  of short-term  bias  of financial
intermediation  in  Colombia,  it  needs  to  be noted  that  the  traditional
explanations  of "short-termism"  of financial  intermediaries,  which  have,  in
the  context  of Latin  American  countries,  emphasized  the  role  of inflation,  do
not  hold in the  case  of Colombia,  at least  not  with  equal  force.8
29.  Indeed,  in  contrast  to  most  other  Latin  American  countries,  the  rate
of inflation  in Colombia  has  not  historically  been  very  high,  neither  has it
been  highly  volatile. This follows  immediately  from  causal  observation,  and
more  formally  from  the  econometric  investigation  of inflation  variability  in
Colombia  and its  comparison  with  other  countries  reported  in  Table  7.  Thus,
when inflation  volatility  is  measured  by the  standard  deviation  of the
unexpected  component  of inflation  process  (i.e.  inflation  shock),  the
estimate  for  Colombia,  based  on  quarterly  data  from  1980  to 1986,  yields  a
value  of 6.2,  which  is  significantly  lower  than  a corresponding  value  of
121.8  for  Argentina,  or 15.5  for  Mexico. Interestingly,  such  a low  estimate
of inflation  volatility  in  Colombia  is  striklngly  close  to that  in  Korea.
Moreover,  this  similarity  holds  when inflation  variability  is  measured  by the
estimated  coefficient  on lagged  inflation  in  a first-order  autoregressive
scheme. These  estimates  are  0.63  and  0.51  respectively  for  Colombia  and
Korea.
30.  The  above  discussion  and  empirical  evidence,  thus helps  to cast
doubt  on the  conventional  belief  that  inflation  variability  has  been in
8  High and  variable  inflation  is  viewed,  according  to this  line  of argument,
to increase  overall  uncertainty  and  to obscure  the  identification  of
different  sources  and  nature  of risk.  For  example,  the  conventional
decomposition  of risk  associated  with  financial  transactions  into  various
components  of interest  rate  risk,  business  risk,  regulatory  risk,  is  rendered
meaningless  when inflation  exceeds  a certain  threshold  and  when its
variability  swaps  other  dimensions  of risk. Under  these  circumstances,
financial  instruments  tend  to  be overwhelmingly  concentrated  in  the  short-end
of maturity  spectrumTable  7: lnlALln  VariAbillty  4  ColonhiA and aSgerin
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Uev.i-Usanq  ICottnirt  e  Developed  Co entrios
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venez  Il  *'.  t,  3.  6Lu
I ahabde  *.. 51 S  5. 6t 
A  v  h"67  ?9.62  AvgihAGE  *  J  .72  2. 64
Notes:  1/  This  is  the  estimated  coefficient  (aA  on  lagged  Inflation  in  a
first-order  autoregression  scheme  of  the  form.4X,  - A0*A 1X,-1*U  where  X'  is
rate  of Inflation  In  CPI,  and  U  is  an  error  term. Thus.  tAe  Ligher  the  value
of  Al  the  higher  the  degree  of inflation  variability.  In  the  extreme  case
that  Al  - 1,  Inflation  follows  a random  walks.
2/  Inflation  shock  Is  the  standard  deviation  of the  residual  of the
error  Lerm  in  the  autoregression  on  equation  described  above.
Sources:  Based  on  data  from  1F, Interl  ational  FinanciAl  Statistica- 25 -
Colombia  the  cause  of short-term  bias  of financial  intermediaries.  There
appears  no compelling  evidence,  at  least  in  a comparative  perspective,  to
link  inflation  volatility  to short-termism  phenomeron  in  Col4mbia's  financial
institutions.  The  sources  and  causes  of the  problem  seem  to  reside  somewhere
else,  and  in  particular,  in three  areas:  (i)  general  uncertainties  facing
economic  agents  which  are  not  necessarily  associated  with inflation;  (ii)
high interest  rates;  and (iii)  discriminatory  regulatory  p.:actices  and  wide
disparities  among  different  financial  institutions  with regard  to  reserve
requirements  and  forced  investment,  which  have led  to impede  competition  and
innovative  efforts  to  offer  longer-term  deposit  instrument  and facilities.
Under  the  first  category,  the  broader  degree  of  uncertainty  associated  with
security  conditions  in the  country  and  the  traditional  short-term  orientation
of macro  policy  in Colombia,  and  the  lack  of a clear  long-term  strategy  and
indicative  planning  are  obvious  candidates.  These  are  mutually  reenforcing
while  the  nature  of the  interaction  and  direction  of causality  cannot  easily
be established.
b)  Directed  Colume  and  Relative  Significance.
31.  Table  8 puts  the  recent  evolution  of the  directed  credit  programs  in
Colombia  in a quantitative  perspective.  The  table  presents  data  on end-year
(1980-1987)  outstanding  credit,  both in  volume  and  in  relation  to  GDP,
extended  to the  business  and  agricultural  sector  for  the  purpose  of financing
investment  (both  working  capital  and  fixed  assets)  and  for  export  expansion.
Institutionally,  these  programs  include  credit  extended  through  the  Fondo
Financiero  Agropecuario  (FFAP),  the  Fondo  Financiero  Industrial  (FFI),  and
the  Fondo  Para  Inversiones  Privadas  (FIP),  all  administered  by the  Banco  de
La Republica,  and  through  the  Fondo  de  Promocion  de  Exportaciones  (PROEXPO),
which  is administered  by another  government  agency  and  funded  by an earmarked
tax  on imports. Included  under  the  rubric  of directed  credit  programs  are
also  external  credit  linesTableJ3:  Directed  Credit  Recent  Evolution  and Relative  Significance
I In  SIIIIons  of Colomblan  Pesos  and In  percent  I
End  of  Year  1910  1937
19n  10111  19n2  19on  1393  13n%  14n36  393
1. Total  Pirected  Credit  64  5  el  B  115  9  141 8  188  1  230  9  299  2  n  a.
I  1. Development  Credit  (Fondos  Flnancleros)  52.3  67.3  94.0  122  5  157.5  106.7  216  6  305.1
*  FFI  3 9  1  8  4.8  5.9  *6  *  .*  7.'9  *.7
b. FIP  31  3.5  5  2  1.7  6  7  82  9 .6
c. PROEXPO  22.5  31.9  *5 3  57.4  73 4  S7  1  311  2  n  a.
d. FFA  22.9  28.2  38.7  S1  6  67.7  84  0  102.3  123.4
1.2. Esternat  Credit  12  2  14.3  21.9  25.3  30 6  44.2  62.6  na.
2  Total  Ranking System  Credit  343.9  480.3  59.s9  734.9  640.8  1021.3  1362.5  1034.2
3. Directed  Credit/Tot.  5kg  Synte  Credit  (1)  18.8  17.0  19.4  20  1  22.4  22  6  22  0  n  a
4.  DIr,eted  CreditiCDP  (1)  4.1  4.1  A 6  4  8  4.9  *  6  *  S  na.
5  Dltrectd  Credit  In  Constant  1980  Ptlces  64.5  66  4  75.7  80.2  63 5  82 1  82 *  n  a
Notes  and Sourceos
I1  Total  Directed  CredLt-Development  Credit  (Fondos  Financetros)  plus  external  credit
21  Deflated  by  CDP  Implicit price  deflator
Source:  Staff  *stliates  based  on  data  from  The  Banco  d4e la Republics.27  -
supported  by the  World  Bank  and  IDB  loans  which  have  also  been  administered
by the  BR and  channelled  primarily  through  Corporaciones  Financieros  (CFS).9
The  outstanding  volume  of these  credit  lines  amounted  at the  end  of 1986  to
Col$300  billion  (4.5  percent  of  GDP),  which  accounted  for  22  percent  of total
outstanding  credit  of formal  financial  markets. Of this  amount  roughly  50
percent  is  accounted  for  by the  development  credits  (Fondos  Financieros),
which  are  financed  by various  forms  of taxation  levied  on imports  or on
financial  institutions  through  excessive  reserve  requirements  or forced
investment. It is,  thus,  this  component  of government  credit  programs  which
has  been the  subject  of  policy  controversy  and  debate. The  balance  of this
section  will,  hence,  concentrates  on two  aspects  of these  programs: (i)
their  volumes,  and (ii)  the  degree  of interest  rate  subsidization  involved.
32.  Table  9 sets  the  tone;  it describes  the  evolution  of development
credits  (Fondos  Financieros)  from  1976  to 1978,  and  reveals  two  important
facts. First,  that  the  volume  of total  credit  facilitated  through  official
funds  (Fondos  Financieros)  has increased  in  nominal  term  from  Col$15.4
billion  in 1976 (2.9  percent  of GDP)  to Col$305.1  billion  (3.4  percent  of
GDP) in  1987.  In relation  to total  credit  market  activity,  however,  the
volume  of official  funds  has tended  to decline  during  this  period,  from  an
average  of 24.1  percent  in the  second  half  of the  1970s  to 16.5  percent  in
1987.  Second,  more than  40 percent  of total  volume  of official  funds  has
been  channeled  to the  agricultural  sector  through  the  FAA.
33.  In  addition  to its  dominant  position  in the  total  supply  of
development  credits,  the  FFA is  distinguished  also  by its  high  degree  of
9  The  data  excludes  credits  through  the  Fondo  de Capitalizacion  Empresarial
(FCE)  on the  grounds  that  this  line  finances  individuals  purchase  of company
shares  and,  hence,  is  not  comparable  with  other  official  credit  lines  such  as
FFAP,  FFI,  FIP,  and  PROEXPO,  which  are  in  essence  debt  capital,  whether  they
originate  from  foreign  or domestic  sources.Tahl  9  Oititandfia  Dewtopint  Credit  to  Eutivin.  Prt  e  S.-t
I  In  Sillbona of  Coilihlan  P.ioa  and  In  pwrcent
End of  Tears  1396-1i11.
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Source:  Staff  eatlmtee  based  on  data  from  The Banco  d.t  Is  Republira- 29 _
politicization,  higher  degree  of subsidization,  and its  rigid  interest  rate
s  aicture.  The  administered  borrowing  rate  on loans  secured  through  the  FFA
in 1985,  for  instance,  was 21  percent,  as compared  to  corresponding  rates  of
33.8  percent  and  32.3  percent  applied  to loans  directed  to industry  through
the  FIP  and  FFI  respectively.  This  favored  position  of agriculture  relative
to industry,  both in  terms  of its  higher  share  of directed  credit  allocation
and  higher  degree  of interest  rate  subsidization,  is  an interesting  feature
of Colombian  political  economy. There  is also  the  belief  that  the
agricultural  sector  has  been  traditionally  discriminated  against  in  other
areas  of  macro  policy,  particularly  trade  policy. Motivated  by this  belief
and  pressed  by the  fact  that  the  agricultural  sector  relies  on credit  as its
primary  source  of finance  and  its  virtual  exclusion  from  the  resources  of
capital  markets,  have led  the  agricultural  community  to rally  its  political
power  and to  resist  any  changes  in the  status-quo. IJI  a sense,  the  sector
views its  more  favorable  treatment  in the  finance  area  as a compensatory  and
corrective  policy,  balancing  of the  discriminatory  treatment  that  it is
subjected  to in  other  areas  of  macro  policy. There  may  be some  valid
justification  for  such  a position. In  any  event,  the  fact  remains  that  no
policy  reform  in the  areas  of development  credit  programs  can  be
realistically  expected  to  succeed  unless  it is  firmly  grounded  in the
political  economy  of the  agricultural  sector  and  the  peculiarities  of its
credit  demand. 10 These  peculiarities  include  the  relatively  high  degree  of
agricultural  sector  in development  credits  and  the  inelastic  nature  of its
loan  demand. The outstanding  credit  facilitated  through  the  FFA  accounted  in
10 It is an important  characteristic  of agricultural  finance  that  loan  demand
in that  sector  tends  to  be very inelastic. This  means  that  higher  interest
rates  typically  lead  to  financial  distress  and  bankruptcy,  rather  than  to
lower  demand. The farm  crisis  in  the  U.S; in  the  wake of  high interest  rates
of the  1980s  provides  a convincing  illustration  of this  fact,  so does  the
enormous  political  pressure  exerted  by the  agricultural  community  for  an
interestink  study  of the  farm  crisis  in  the  U.S. (see  Calomiris,  Hubbard  and
Stock [198Z)*  - 30 -
1986,  for  instance,  for  52  percent  of total  institutional  credit  extenved  to
the  agricultural  sector. In  contrast,  the  share  of industry  in development
credits  relative  to its  total  demand  for  credit  amounted  in  the  same  year to
5.7  percent  excluding  PROEXPO  and  47.6  percent  when  PROEXPO  was totally
allocated  to industry. 11
34.  Interest  rate  subsidy  has  been one  other  important  aspect  of  directed
credit  programs  in  Colombia  which  has  generated  a  great  deal  of  policy
controversy  and  debate. There  is  no doubt  that  the  extent  of interest  rate
subsidy  has  been  relatively  large,  averaging  for  the  period  1976  - 1978  to
about  19.6  percentage  (see  Table  10). Recent  measures,  however,  to link
lending  rates  applied  to development  credits  to  DTF (a  market-determined
composite  deposit  rate),  have led  to reduce  significantly  the  magnitude  of
such  subsidy. In 1987  this  has fallen  to 10  percentage  points  for  the
development  credits  as a whole. The  main reason  has  been the  sharp  increase
in  lending  rates  applied  to PROEXPO  and  to industrial  funds. It is  essential
that  this  policy  direction  be followed,  and  to the  extent  possible,  to  bring
credits  channeled  through  the  FFAP  under  the  same  rule  and  treatment. It is
also  essential  to lower  the  currently  high  lending  rates;  such  efforts  need
to  address  both  sides  of lending  rate  equation,  i.e.,  the  deposit  and  margin
rates. The  official  ceilings  imposed  on  August  29,  1988,  seem  hardly  to
provide  a long-term  solution. They  could  only  alleviate  temporarily  the
pressure  or interest  rates. But  as table  11 shows,  there  has  not  yet  been
any  sign  ot downward  movement  in the  pattern  of deposit  and  lending  rates.
11 This is  of course  not  valid  given  the  fact  that  PROEXPO  finances
agricultural  exports  also. The exact  distribution  of PROEXPO  funds  between
industry  and  agriculture  is,  however,  not  clear.- 31  -
Table  10:  INTEREST  RATE  SUBSIDY,  1976-1987
Market  Lending  Development  Subsidy
Year  Rate  Funds
1976  38.1  21.0  17.1
1977  38.1  17.6  20.5
1978  36.5  17.4  19.1
1979  36.6  20.9  15.7
1980  40.2  22.7  17.5
1981  47.3  22.7  24.6
1982  47.9  22.6  25.3
1983  43.7  21.5  22.2
1984  44.7  22.6  22.1
1985  45.3  22.6  22.7
1986  41.2  22.6  18.6
1987  41.4  31.4  10.0
Average  41.8  22.1  19.6
Source: Staff  estimate  based  and  data  from  Banco  de la  Republica.- 32  ^
TABLE  1_;  COLOKBIA.  RECENT  CHANGES  IN KrY INTEREST RATES
SELECTED  PERtODS
(ANNUAL  RATES IN  PERCENTAGE)
Before  Ceilln  after  a'-
July  July  Aug.  Sep.  Sep.  Sep.
Instrumcnts  15  - 22  2  9  22  *  2  12  *  16 .;  :
1.  Denosie  Rates  (90-day  CDT)
Banks  35.0  34.9  31.5  31.5  31.3
CF.  36.5  37.0  34.0  33.4  33*
2.  Lnding  Rates
Banks  47.9  43.3  39.0  39.9  3*99
CFs  45.7  45.3  45.5  43.2  42.3
CFCs  46.5  45.9  44.9  44.0  ,3.3
3.  Government  Paper
(JAN  CtASS  A 180-dav)  35.6  35.5  29.5  31.5  29.2
Source: Asoclaclon  Bancaria  de  Colombia.  Inform*  aseadistico  semanal,
various  issues.- 33  -
IV.  X Refor  f  1986  and  Corporte cost  gf  capital
1.  Intzgditgn
35.  This  section  analyzes  the  impacts  of the  1986  tax  reform  on the  real
cost  of capital  in  the  nonfinancial  corporate  sector  of the  Colombian
economy. The  analysis  concentrates  on the  marginal  cost  of capital,  which
refers  to the  rental  or user  cost  of capital  and  is  defined  as the  real  cost
of funds  (both
debt  and  equity),  adjusted  for  the  impact  of accelerated  depreciation  and
cost  of asset  decay. This  yields  a  measure  of the  real  cost  of capital  which
is  most relevant  for  the  analysis  of business  investment  incentives.  To
finance  their  new investment  expenditures,  firms  are  assumed  to draw  first  on
their  internally  generated  sources  of funds,  secondly,  on loans  obtained  from
subsidized  official  funds,  and lastly  on loans  secured  from  financial
institutions.  For  this  reason,  the  marginal  cost  of debt  is  measured  by the
market  lending  rate.  2 And  the  cost  of  equity  is  measured  as the  average
(expost)  real  return  on equity  after  making  proper  adjustment  for  inflation  -
induced  depreciation  in real  the  value  of debt  and  economic  depreciation  of
underlying  capital  base.  This  combined  measure  for  the  aggregate
non-financial  corporate  sector  is  used  as a  basis  for  assessing  the  impact  of
the  tax  reform.
12  This  applies  more  realistically  to  large  firms.  For  small  and  medium  size
firms,  it  is  the  informal  market  rate  which  represent  their  marginal  cost  of
debt.- 34  -
2.  T  ftn1va:  P -- ta ia  of  The  1096  Tax  Reform
36.  The  three  provisions  of the  tax  reform  of 1986,  which  are  thought  to
have  bearing  upon  the  cost  of  capital  are:  (i)  the  gradual  elimination  of
the  deductibility  of the  inflationary  component  of interest  payments;  (ii)
the  elimination  of dividend  income  taxes;  and (iii)  the  reduction  in  the
corporate  income  tax  rate  from  40 percent  to 30  percent. These  measures  are
adoptad  to  eliminate  the  long-standing  bias  against  equity  financing,  and
thereby,  to  bring  about  a  more  balanced  corporate  capital  structure. By
shifting  tax  incentives  towards  equity  financing,  the  authorities  are  hoping
to  reverse  the  trend  in corporate  leverag,  ratios  which,  as noted  previously,
have increased  dramatically  over  the  past  two  decades. But  success  is  by no
means  assured,  and  the  chief  reason  relates  to the  expected  limited  supply  of
equity  capital. The  supply  of external  equity  is likely  to  be scarce  due  to
companies'  reluctance  to issue  new  shares. The  family-based  structure  of
corporate  ownership  and  the  desire  to  maintain  operating  control  over
corporation  activi.y,  are  strong  forces  in  Colombia  which  operate  to  make
company  management  very  hesitant  to resort  to  outside  equity  financing,  even
if  relative  cost  considerations  favor  such  a financing  strategy. Also,  the
supply  of internal  equity  is likely  to  be adversely  affected  by the
elimination  of dividend  income  taxes. Expectations  that  this  provision  of
the  tax  reform  may  be reversed  or changed  have  already  prompted  company
shareholders  to  exert  considerable  pressure  on management  to increase  the
proportion  of company  earnings  distributed  in the  form  of dividend  income.
37.  Thus,  the  danger  exists  that  the  increase  in the  cost  of capital
associated  with the  gradual  phasing  out  of  deductibility  of inflationary
component  of interest  payments  may  hamper  real  investment  activity  and,
hence,  growth  and  profitability.  The  lower  level  of real  investment  may- 35  -
reduce  the  overall  demand for  funds  including  also  debt,  but  this  outcome
would be  far  from  the  *uthorities'  objective  of  promotLng  substitution  of
equity  for  debt  financing  at  a  rising  level  of  real  investment.
38.  Yet,  one  thing  is  certain;  ti..  gradual  elimination  of  the
inflationary  component  of  interest  expenses  from  corporate  taxable  income
will  help  to  break  the  linkage  between  inflation  and  the  real  cost  of  debt,
which  in  the  past  has  been  crucially  important.  As  it  is  generally  known,  in
the  presence  of  full  tax  deductibility  of  interest  expenses,  inflation
directly  affects  the  real  cost  of  debt  to  corporate  borrowers. 13  This  happons
because  interest  payments  (in  inflationary  environments)  are  partly  payments
of  principal.  The treatment  of  the  inflationary  component  of  interest
payments  which  are  in  the  nature  of  capital  expenditure  as  current  expenses
for  tax  purposes,  thus  confers  a  subsidy  in  the  form  of  tax  savings  to  equity
holders.  The  higher  the  rate  of  inflation,  the  higher  the  value  of  this  tax
savings,  and  hence  the  lower  the  real  cost  of  debt.
39.  The  significance  of  this  inflation  related  tayr shield  for  the  period
prior  to  the  tax  reform  of  1986  in  Colombia  is  demonstrated  in  Table  12. The
calculations  are  based  on  the  average  lending  rates  on  loans  secured  from
financial  institutions'  own resources,  which  account  for  roughly  50 percent
of  total  credit  extended  to  the  business  sector  in  recent  years. 14
13  See,  for  instance,  Cohn and  Modigliani,  (1985).
14  In  1985,  for  instance,  loans  from  financial  institutions  accounted  for
about  48.5%  of  total  formal  market  credit  extended  to  the  non-financial
business  sector,  See  Table  A.1  for  more detail.- 36  -
40.  Table  12  shows  that  without  the  inflation  tax  shield,  the  real  cost
of  debt  would  have  been  much  higher  (column  1).  In  1985,  for  instance,  the
real  cost  of  borrowing  from  financi-l  instLtutions  would  have  been  12.25%,  as
compared  to  the  actual  rate  of  2.3  percent.
41.  Under  the  tax  reform  of  1986,  however,  interest  expenxes  are  only
partially  deductible.  The  deductibility  of  the  inflationary  component  of
interest  payments  is  to  be  gradually  phased  out  over  a ten-year  period.  In
fact,  by  1996,  only  real  interest  payments  will  be  eligible  for  deduction
against  income  taxeu. 15 By  that  time  the  increase  in  the  real  cost  of  debt
would  amount  to  8.1  percentage  points,  assuming  the  current  inflation  of  27
percent  per  year.
42.  Of  course,  the  cost  of  debt  is  only  one  component  of  the  overall  cost
of  capital  which  is  relevant  for  investment  decisions.  For  investment  in
fixed  assets,  i.e.  plant,  machinery,  and  equipment,  the  other  main  components
of  the  cost  of  capital  are: cost  of  equity,  the  acquisition  price  of
capital,  i.e.,  the  cost  of  acquiring  one  unit  of  machinery  and  equipment,
taxation,  depreciation  allowances,  and  the  cost  of  asset  decay;  i.e  ,  real
depreciation  in  terms  of  wear  and  tear  and  the  obsolescence  of  fixed  assets.
15  To  formalize  the  scheme  let  the  parameter  "a"  denote  the  allowable
proportion  of  inflation  which  is  tax  deductible  in  a  particular  year,  and  let
the  real  cost  of  debt  in  that  year  be  denoted  by  "'";  it  can  be  shown,  that,
Or"  is  given  by:
r  - (l-u)r-a.u.x.  (1)
where  "u"  is  the  corporate  tax  rate,  "r"  is  the  real  rate  of  interest  and  "x"
is  the  rate  of  inflation.
It  will  be  seen  from  equation  (1)  that  when a  - 1,  that  is,  under  the
previous  tax  regime,  the  real  cost  of  debt  would be  reduced  by  the  full  value
of  the  inflation  tax  shield,  i.e.,  u.x.  But  after  the  tax  reform  of  1986,
"a"  will  gradually  decline  by  10% each  year  to  reach  zero  in  1996.  At  that
time,  the  real  cost  of  debt  will  be  r-(l-u)r  indicating  an  overall  increase
of  u.x.~  37  -
Table  12  Th:  -%pact  of Inflation  on  Real  Marginal  Cost  of  Debt
(1970-1985)
Year  After  Tax  Inflation  Real  Effective
Real  Rate  of  Tax  Shield  Rate.(3)
Interest  (1)  (2)
1970
1970  7.71  3.53  4.18
1971  9.26  3.71  5.55
1972  1.28  4.70  -3.42
1973  -3.09  7.12  -10.21
1974  0.74  10.19  -9.44
1975  9.13  9.15  -0.02
1976  7.54  10.21  -2.67
1977  4.65  11.58  -6.93
1978  12.93  6.90  6.03
1979  11.61  9.62  1.99
1980  10.95  11.02  -0.07
1981  14.82  9.12  5.70
1982  13.89  9.90  3.98
1983  14.00  8.15  5.85
1984  13.57  8.87  4.70
1985  12.24  9.96  2.28
Notes: More  formally,  the  above  columns  are  defined  as:
(1)  - (1-u)r
(2) - u*x
(3)  - (1) - (2)
Where  u is  corporate  tax  rate,  r is  real  rate  of interest,  nominal  bank  loan
rate  minus  rate  of inflation  in  GDP  implicit  price  deflator;  x is  rate  of
inflation  (GDP  price  deflator).- 38 -
The  procedure  for  incorporating  the  influence  of these  factors  on the  cost
of capital  under  the  Colombia  tax  code  is  described  in the  Annex,  where  a
general  expression  for  the  real  cost  of capital  for  the  non-financial
corporate  sector  is  derived. The  Annex  also  contains  the  various  assumptions
underlying  our  estimates  of real  cost  of capital  for  corporations  in
Colombia. The final  simulation  results,  however,  are  reported  here in  Table
13.  The  Table  also  contains  the  historical  estimates  for  1981-1985  period  to
serve  as the  reference  points  to  which  the  two  altornative  simulated  results
of 1996  are  compared. The two  scenarios  are  defined  assuming  (i),  that  the
aggregate  debt-capital  ratio  remains  constant  at its  historically  estimated
value  of 0.86  and (ii),  that  it  declines  by 5  percent  per  year.  In the  first
scenario,  the  real  cost  of capital  increases  from  an average  value  of 14.6
percent  in  1981-85  period  to 22.5  percent  in  1996.  In  other  words  the  real
cost  of capital  increases  by roughly  8  percentage  points. Such  an increase
is somehow  moderated  in  the  second  scenario  by the  posited  reduction  in  the
corporate  debt  ratio. Under  this  scenario,  the  increase  in the  real  cost  of
capital  amounts  to  6.7  percentage  points  by 1996,  which  is still  quite
considerable.- 39  -
Table  13  The  1986  Tax  Roform  and  the  Real  Marginal  Cost  of Capital
(Percent  per  Annum)







_Constant  Debt  RAtio  Changing  Debt  Ratio  a/
1986  8.8  8.8
1987  14.5  14.5
1988  15.3  15.3
1989  16.6  16.7
1990  17.6  17.7
1991  18.6  18.6
1992  19.6  19.4
1993  20.5  20.1
1994  21.5  20.7
1995  22.5  21.3
*  Based  on the  assumption  that  aggregate  corporate  debt  capital  ratio
declines  by 5  percent  a  year,  starting  in  1989._ 40  o
3.  Concluding  10marks.
43.  The  authorities  in  Colombia  have  undertaken  a  comprehensive  tax
reform  which  contains  several  provisions  that  are  often  advocated  for  high
inflation  countries. This  note  has  briefly  examined  the  implications  for
real  corporate  cost  of capital  of three  of the  provisions  contained  in the
tax  form,.  i.e.,  (i)  the  gradual  elimination  of the  deductibility  of the
inflationary  component  of interest  payments,  (ii)  the  reduction  in  the
corporate  income  tax  rate  from  40  percent  to 30  percent,  and (iii)  the  change
in  depreciation  allowances  to  a  more  generous  scheme,  (40,  40,  20  percent).
The  analysis  is still  at a preliminary  stage,  so the  findings  need  to  be
interpreted  accordingly. Bearing  this  in  mind,  the  main  conclusions  can  be
summarized  as follows:
i)  The  reform  will tend  to increase  the  real  cost  of capital  for
corporate  borrowers. The increase,  based  on current  trends  in inflation  and
interest  rates,  is  estimated,  for  the  aggregate  non-financial  corporate
sector,  to  be in the  order  of 8 percentage  points  by 1996.  Such  an increase
is  quite  considerable  and  it seems  inconceivable  that  profitability  could
increase  to an extent  as to leave  investment  incentives  unchanged.
Therefore,  the  likelihood  exists  that  fixed  investment  will  be adversely
affected.
ii)  The  reform  will  be effective  in  breaking  the  linkage  between
inflation  and the  real  cost  of  borrowing,  a  phenomenon  which  has, in the
past,  been  directly  responsible  for  lowering  the  real  cost  of debt  and
presumably  for  encouraging  leverage  financing.
iii) It is  too  early  to  see  the  impact  of the  tax  reform  on the
development  of capital  markets. It  is true  that  the  primary  equity  market
has  experienced  an impressive  growth  over  the  past  three  years. The  primary
shares  offered  by listed  companies  increased  by 53  percent  and 72  percent  in
1986  and  1987,  respectively  (see  Table  14). It is  not,  however,  clear,
whether  such  an increase  reflects  the  influences  of  higher  tax  incentives  for
equity  financing,  or the  sheer  pressure  of credit  shortages,  which  have
compelled  companies  to  consider  alternatives  to  bank  borrowing.- 41  -
Table  14  Primary  Share  Offering  by Non-Financial  Listed
Companies: 1985-1987
(In  Billions  of Colombian  Pesos  & Annual  Percent  Change)
In Billions of ColoMbian  _esos  Annual  Pereant
1985  1986  1987  1986/85  1987/86
1. Shares  8.71  13.34  23.03  53.09  72.66
2. Convertlble  4.53  4.88  2.08  7.73  -57.48
Bonds
3.  Total  13.24  18.22  25.10  37.57  37.80
Source: Staff  Estimate  Based  on Data  from  Comision  Nacional  de  Valores  de
Colombia, nfia  Laboras  1987-1988.- 42  -
V.  lslona  and  poliew  Ruagati
44.  A strong  expansion  in the  pace  of private  business  investment  has
been a remarkable  feature  of recent  economic  recovery  in  Colombia. The
sustainability  of this  investment  expansion  is  currently  perceived  to  be
critically  important  to the  prospects  for  economic  growth  and  productivity
gain  over  the  next  few  years. This  paper (chapter)  has concentrated  on three
areas  of economic  policy,  demand,  financial  and  taxation,  and  their  potential
influences  on private  business  investment.  The  main  result  and  policy
suggestions  are  summarized  below.
mahiand  Factors
45.  On the  demand  side,  the  key  requirement  is the  continued  expansion  of
domestic  demand  to  motivate  firms'  desire  for  capacity  expansion. The
initial  condition  is  favorable  since  many firms  are  already  operating  at  high
capacity  utilization  rates. Policy,  thus,  needs  to  build  upon this  favorable
condition  by encouraging  demand  towards  investment  and  away  from  consumption.
A desirable  policy  option  in this  respect  would  be an investment  tax  credit
scheme  designed  to lower  the  effective  price  of  capital  goods  to the  business
sector.
46.  Yet,  business  investment  decisions  are  as  much governed  by current
realities  as driven  by future  expectations.  And  here,  there  is  a strong  case
for  macro  stability,  policy  transparency,  and  credibility.  There  is  no way
of exaggerating  the importance  of a predictable  environment  for  investment
performance;  business  investment  decisions  are,  by nature,  forward  looking,
and they  are  often  irrevisible.  This  means  that,  when faced  with  high.
uncertainty,  firms  respond  by simply  not investing  or  just  waiting,  or  by
investing  in financial  and  liquid  assets. In this  context,  policy  has  an- 43  -
important  role  to play  in  casting  light  on the  evolution  of  main  economic
variables,  such  as  GDP, interest  and  exchange  rate,  and  credit  and  monetary
aggregates. Frequent  forecast  of these  variables  would  tend  to  provide
useful  anchors  for  private  sector  expectations.
Coat  of  Capital
47.  The starting  point  for  consideration  of potential  policy  influence  on
the  cost of  capital,  and through  that,  on investment,  is tho  observation  that
the  real  cost  of capital  in  Colombia  is  high in  real  terms,  even for  a
developing  economy. The  real (marginal)  cost  of capital  to the  non-financial
corporate  sector  is  currently  about  16  percent. This  could  further  increase
as the  gradual  elimination  of inflationary  component  of  business  interest
payments  takes  its  effect. Unless  interest  rates  are  reduced,  the  complete
elimination  of inflationary  component  of interest  payments,  could,  by 1996,
add  an additional  6  percentage  points  to the  current  high levels. Such  an
increase,  however,  could  be moderated  by extending  the  period  over  which  the
tax  deductibility  provision  is  scheduled  to  be phased  out.
48.  What  does this  trend  in the  real  cost  of  capital  suggest  for  the  role
of  policy? Clearly,  either  profitability  has  to  be increased  or other
component  of cost  of capital  has  to  be brought  under  control  if investment
incentives  are  not to  be adversely  affected. Three  areas  of policy  options
are  considered  below:
49.  First,  there  seems  limited  scope  for  policy  influence  on the
profitability  side;  there  is  a strong  cyclical  component  in  pattern  of
profitability  in  Colombia,  which  stems  from  the  cyclical  behavior  of  real
wages  and  rate  of capacity  utilization.  Thus,  profitability  tends  to  be high
during  the  upward  phase  of the  cycle,  as evi'sat  by the  experience  of the- 44 -
1986  - 1987  period,  and  low  durlng  the  downturn. In this  sense,  the  extent
to  which  policy  can  influence  profitability  depends  on its  success  in
influencing  the  business  cycle.
50.  Second,  efforts  to induce  corporations  to substitute  equity  for  debt
financing  should  lead  to  a more  balanced  corporate  capital  structure  and
possibly  to a lower  overall  cost  of capital. Indeed.  an important  provision
of  .1986  tax  reform,  i.e.,  the  elimination  of  dividend  income  taxes,  was
particularly  designed  to that  end.  This  has resulted  in eliminating  the
double  taxation  of capital  in Colombia,  and  thus  has  helped  to reduce  the
cost  of equity  financing. This  may  have  been also  partly  responsibi for  the
impressive  growth  of the  primary  equity  market  observed  over the  past three
years. The  primary  shares  offered  by listed  companies  increased  by 53
percent  and 72%  in 1986  and  1987  respectively.  But  given  the  very small  size
of the  market,  its  rapid  growth  of the  past  three  years  is likely  to  have
marginal  impact  on the  cost  of capital,  or on the  pattern  of corporate
finance. On the  other  hand,  the  elimination  of dividend  income  taxes  and the
expectation  that  it  may  be reversed,  prompted  shareholders  to  exert
increasing  pressure  on corporate  management  to increase  the  proportion  of
corporate  earnings  that  is  distributed  in the  form  of dividend. As a
consequence,  retained  earnings  are  adversely  affected  and,  through  that,
corporations'  ability  to finance  their  investment  internally.
51.  Third,  there  is  potentially  some  room  for  policy  influence  on the
cost  of capital  through  tax  treatment  of  depreciation  allowances.  The
prevailing  tax  code  for  capital  consumption  allowances  is  based  on historical
cost  accounting  system. This  system  tends  to  understate  the  economic  value
of a portion  of fixed  assets  which  is  used  up during  the  process  of- 45  -
production  and,  hence,  over state  taxable  earnings. A shift  towards  a
replacement  cost  accounting  system  should  lead  to eliminate  this  distortion
and,  furthermore,  to enhance  corporations'  internal  cash  generation  capacity.
52.  It  would,  however,  seem  sanguine  to assume  that  the  policy  measures
listed  above  could  lead  to  reduce  the  cost  of capital  sufficiently  if
concerted  efforts  were  not  undertaken  to lower  the  prevailing  high  lending
rates. The  problem,  here,  has  both  macro  and  financial  sector  origins.
Under  the  first  category,  high inflation  and  low  savings  rates  are among
prime  candidates.  Under  the  latter  category,  the  source  of the  problem  is
the  high cost  of financial  intermediation  in  Colombia. The  current  margin  of
around  9 percentage  points,  between  average  lending  and  deposit  rates  in the
financial  sector  (Bancos  and  Corporaciones  Financieros),  Is rather  high  by
international  standard. This is in  part  due  to the  short-torm  bias of
financial  intermediaries,  which  imposes  a  high administrative  cost  on
financial  institutions,  and in  part,  due  to the  cost  of financing  the
official  funds. While  these  funds  provide  below  market  loans  to  priority
sectors,  they  also  entail  costs  to the  financial  sector,  which  are, in  turn,
passed  on to corporate  borrowers.
3.  Availability  and  Allocation  of  Investabloe  Funds
53.  Of course,  for  small  and  medium  size  firms,  it is  not so  much  the  cost
of capital  as it is the  sheer  availability  of capital  which  is  often  the
operating  constraint  on their  investment  behavior. These  firms  are  very
vulnerable  to the  risk  of monetary  and  credit  constraints.  They are  likely
to be crowded  out  during  periods  of credit  crunch. These  characteristics  of
these  firms,  thus,  suggest  an important  role  for  government  intervention  in
the  financial  sector. Such  an intervention,  however,  should,  in  principle,
be directed  to  counteract  any  undue  credit  rationing  imposed  on them  by- 46  -
financial  instltutions.  To the  extent  that  these  firms'  Lnvestment  and
productive  activity  can  be regarded,  from  a social  welfare  point  of  viow,  at
higher  value  than  equivalent  investment  by large  firms,  there  is  some
justification  for  their  preferential  treatment. In the  case  of Colombia,
there  are  at least  two  reasons  that  argue  for  such  a treatment:  (i)  that
these  firms  toed  to  be concentrated  on relatively  more  labor-intensive
activities  and  sectors;  and (ii)  that  theit  existence  and  survival  are
necessary  to guard  against  increased  monopolistic  industrial  structure.- 47  -
ANNE
The Tax Reform of 1986 and the Real Cost of Capital
Derivation of the Cost of Capital
A. 1. Derivation of the Cost of Cagital.
54.  This  annex  draws  on the  modern  theory  of optimal  business  investment
behavior  to derive  an equation  for  the  cost  of capital  services  (rental  price
of capital)  for  the  non-financial  corporate  sector  of  the  Colombian  economy
to  be used  as a  basis  to  evaluating  the  impact  of the  1986  tax  reform. The
cost  of capital  services  refers  to the  cost  of  using  one  unit  of capital  for
a specified  period  of time,  i.e.,  one  year.  It depends  not  only  on the  cost
of funds  and  the  cost  of asset  decay,  but  also  on the  benefits  of tax
provisions  for  businesses'  depreciations  and  for  deductibility  of interest
expenses. Also,  the  determination  of the  cost  of capital  relies  on the
interaction  between  inflation  and  taxes. To the  extent  that  interest
payments  which  are  deductible  against  corporate  income  taxes  are  in  part
payments  of the  principal,  the  real  cost  of capital  is reduced. This
positive  aspect  of inflation  is,  however,  offset  in  Colombian  tax  regime  by
the  historical  cost  base  depreciation  rules,  which  do  not fully  compensate
the  companies  for  higher  replacement  cost  of capital.
55.  Analytically,  the  derivation  of the  cost  of capi.tal  is facilitated  by
focusing  on the  investment  decision  from  the  perspective  of the  equity
holder. Consider  then  an investment  in a  project  costing  Pk  at the  time  of
acquisition. If  a proportion,  b, of that  investment  is financed  through
debt,  and  if the  statutory  corporate  income  tax  rate  is  u, the  shareholder's
share  of the  original  investment  outlays,  under  the  prevailing  tax_ 48  _
depreciation  allowances  ln  Colombia,  will  be  (l-zu-b)  Pk,  where  z is the
present  value  of depreciation  allowances.  For  the  project  to  be  viable,  thLs
must  be equal  to the  present  value  of the  stream  of net income;  more
formally,
Pk(l-zu-b)  - Iexp(-(p.)e)((-i)q?y-((l-,)R.(l-a)ux.(6-*)bP+  UZPk]  dt
where:
q  - real  user  cost  of capital
Pk  - purchase  prlce  of capital
Py  - price  of  output,  GDP  price  deflator
- real  required  rate  of  return  on  equSty
8  - rate  of  depreciation
b  - target  debt  capital  ratio
R  - nominal  rate  of interest
and  other  variables  are  already  defined.
Solving  equation  (A.1)  for  the  real  cost  of capital,  q, yields:
RPkr  l1-uz p-(l-u)R+x  u(l-a)x  b
'  nyt(P  6)  l-u  l-u  b  (l-u)  b
56.  It is apparent  from  equation  (A.1)  that  the  elimination  of the  tax
deductibility  of inflationary  componentp  of  business  interest  payments  will
increase  the  real  cost  of capital,  and  that  this  increase  is  captured  by the
additional  term.
u(1  - a)x  b
1-u
57.  This term  vanishes  when  a-l,  which  corresponds  to the  usual  full
deductibility  of  interest  expenses;  in  that  case,  equation  (2)  takeai  the- 49-
familiar  form [see,  for  instance,  Bosworth  (1985)]. Furthermore,  when the
inflationary  component  of interest  expenses  are  fully  phased  out, i.e.,  when
a-0, the  overall  increase  in the  real  cost  of capital  will  be equal  to
-b
1-  4
which  is independent  of the  interest  rates  and  depends  only  on the  corporate
income  tax  rate,  "u",  rate  of inflation,  "x",  and  corporate  debt-capital
ratio,  "b".
A. 2. .Rexmrnatton of Cornorate  Leverage  Rat.
58.  This,  however,  yields  only  a  partial  view of the  impact  of the  tax
reform  on the  real  cost  of capital. A more  precise  view  should  take  account
of  the  impact  of the  reduction  in the  corporate  tax  rate,  which  works  to
lower  the  real  cost  of capital  to  corporate  borrowers. To that  end,  it is
necessary  to return  to  equation  (2)  and  compare  its  estimates  under  the  two
tax  regimes,  i.e.,  before  and  after  1986. There  remains,  however,  one
obstacle;  there  is great  uncertainty  as to  how  the  firm's  debt  policy,  i.e.,
their  debt leverage  ratio,  may  react  to the  changes  introduced  in  the  tax
reform.  16  The  associated  increase  in  the  real  cost  of debt  should,  in
principle,  discourage  debt  financing. Econometric  analysis  of  past
determinants  of corporate  leverage  ratio  in  Colombia,  does  not  support  this
16 In  a broader  perspective,  this  uncertainty  about  the  impact  of tax  changes
on corporate  debt  leverage  ratio  reflects  the  more fundamental  uncertainty
about  the  determinants  of corporate  financial  structure.  Questions
concerning  firms  decisions  as to  how  much  to draw  on retained  earnings  to
finance  their  investment  expenditures  and  how  much to  raise  externally,
through  debt  or equity,  or  what  portion  of their  earnings  to distribute  as
dividends  and  what  portion  to re-invest,  have,  unfortunately,  still  remained
unsettled  even  in the  context  of industrial  countries  and  even  in theory.
Anomalies,  paradoxes,  and  puzzles  are  more  often  used to  describe  the  state
of  knowledge,  than  rigorous  understandings.  See,  for  instance,  Black  (1976),
Myers (1984),  and  Mayer  (1P88)  for  a  critical  assessment  of the  state  of the
art.- 50  -
assertion,  however. 1 7 Indeed,  as apparent  from  the  estimated  equations
reported  ln  Table  A.  1.,  the  results  indicate  that  the  corporato  sector  in
Colombia  seems  to  have followed  a constant,  desired,  or targeted,
debt-capital  ratio  strategy  with  some  adjustment  lags  involved. Such  a
desired  debt-capital  ratio  can  be  extracted  from  equation  (3.2)  to  yield  an
estimate  of 0.86,  which  appears  consistent  with  the  historical  pattern  of
corporate  finance  in  Colombia.
17 In  addition,  given  the  prevailing  wide  differential  between  interest  rates
and loans  secured  through  official  funds,  which  are  re-discountable  at the
Central  Bank,  and  loans  obtained  from  financial  institutions  (own  resources),
the  higher  overall  cost  of  debt  could  shift  demand  towards  official  funds.
This,  in  conjunction  with  government  policy  of  gradually  raising  rates  on  the
resources  of  official  funds  is  likely  to  put  increasing  pressure  on  lending
rates.- 51  -
Table  A.1.:  Regression  Results  for  Determinants  of  Aggregate  Debt-Capital
Ratio  in the  Non-Financial  Corporate  Sector;  Atwual  Data,
1970-1985.
(A2.1)  dt  - 0.254  - 0.007rt  + 0.724dt-
(2.2)  (1.2)  (4.3)
R2 - 0.60
(A2.2)  dt  - 0.237  + 0.239yt  + 0.728dt4_
(2.2)  (1.6)  (4.3)
R2 - 0.63
(A2.3)  dt  - 0.224  - 0.003rt  + l.9lyt  + 0.74ldt-,
(2.0)  (0.5)  (1.1)  (4.3)
R2  0.64
(A2.4)  dt  - 0.268  - 0.005Rt  + 2.396(utxt)  + U.62ldt4_
(2.6)  (0.5)  (1.2)  (1.7)
R2 - 0.61
t- ratios  are in  parentheses.
Notes  and  Notation; The  variables  are  defined  as follows:
dt  - aggregate  debt-capital  ratio,  where  debt  is  measured  as total  outstanding
loans  from  financial  institutions,  including  resources  facilitated
through  official  funds,  to the  NF corporate  sector;  and  capital  is
measured  as sum  of total  fixed  assets  and  inventories.
r - real  rate  of interest,  bank lending  rate  minus  rate  of inflation  (GDP)
Yt  - deviation  of real  GDP from  its  linear  time  trend.
R - nominal  bank lending  rate.
utxt  - inflation  tax  shield.- 52 _
A. 3.  tam  and  AIaUgVXiona
59.  The  remaining  variables  were  estimated  or assumed  as  follows:
(i)  P.  the  real  required  return  on equity  taken  to  be 9.3  percent
which  is the  average  over  the  1970-85  period  of real  return  on equity  after
making  adjustments  for  inflation-induced  depreciation  in  the  real  value  of
debt  and  economic  depreciation  in  underlying  capital  base.
(ii)  6,  economic  depreciation,  assumed  to  be 5  percent.
(iii)  z, the  present  value  of depreciation  allowances  was  estimated
to  be 0.231  and  0.579  for  the  pre-  and  post-tax  reform  period  respectively.- 53  -
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